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1 Introduction
Auctions have always been employed as a method for selling objects since the earliest moment of
the human history. During the last years, they were used to sell an increasing number of objects,
and different new types of auctions have been modelled to be adapted to various situations.
Several are the factors for these changes. In the first place, the greater deal of attention given
by the literature – both theoretical and empirical – of the last decades, have contributed to un-
derstand mechanisms which regulate bidders’ actions. Therefore, these improvements constituted
also the basis to design new auctions, which had the aim of meeting certain requirements. The
technological advantages, on the other hand, had the effect of increasing the number of possible
participant of auctions – for instance, by widening the geographical catchment area or increasing
the number of bidders – and gave the possibility of organising more complex auction mechanisms.
Over the past few years, several new formats are spreading over televisions and the Inter-
net; they represent new models of trade, and are different from traditional auctions because of
differences in their cost structures and in the organisation rules1.
In this paper we analyse a new auction format, which has experienced some popularity over the
Internet, called Price reveal auction (or “scratch auction”). This format consists in a descending
auction where (1) the price of the object is not publicly observable, (2) participants have to pay
a fee in order to privately observe it, and (3) the price decreases whenever a player observes the
price.
The paper is organised as follows. In next section we will discuss about the new pay–per–bid
auction formats which are being popular on the Internet, and introduce the related literature.
Then, we will introduce a theoretical background for the model of price reveal auctions, analyse
its theoretical properties, and derive the predicted best strategies and the perfect Bayesian equi-
librium. Due to concealment of the price, we will analyse players’ beliefs and the beliefs updating
process. Concluding remarks will follow.
2 New formats and related literature
In recent years, new auction formats have been designed and used online to sell objects. For
their characteristics, they cannot be collocated in the standard literature about auction (such as
Klemperer 1999; Krishna 2002; Menezes and Monteiro 2005).
Among these, the most common new formats are Penny auction, Lowest unmatched bid
auction and Price reveal auction (also known as scratch auction). There are four main factors
which are common among these formats: (1) Players pay a fee to participate the auction or to
submit their bids and entry is endogenous; (2) the auctioneer raises his revenues through fees,
perhaps, the winning bidder could pay a relatively small price to but the object; (3) although the
simplicity of the formats, game theoretical analysis results to be complex and often equilibria
are derived using numerical simulations (Houba et al. 2011); (4) finally, they are relatively recent
online auction formats, and this is reflected in the related literature.
In lowest unmatched sealed bid auctions, a generic player wins the object if she submits the
lowest bid which is also unique (i.e. there does not exist another player who has submitted a bid
of the same amount). Players pay a fee to submit their bids, and entry is endogenous.
This format has been analysed by Houba et al. (2011); Östling et al. (2007); Eichberger and
Vinogradov (2008); Rapoport et al. (2007). The complexity of the strategic space, however, has
1 See, for example, Gupta and Bapna (2001) for a review of the principal online auction mechanisms and of the
related literature.
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forced authors to analyse the format using some restrictive assumptions. Östling et al. (2007)
and Rapoport et al. (2007), for instance, assume submission fees to be zero.
Eichberger and Vinogradov (2008) find that there is not a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies
in their model of lowest unique bid auction, and they characterise the equilibrium in mixed
strategies. However, they find also that data do not fit the predicted optimal strategy.
Houba et al. (2011) focus, instead, mainly on theoretical issues, such as the endogenous entry
of players – which creates uncertainty on the number of participants – and on how players bid
in least unmatched bid format. They analyse symmetric equilibrium of the game, by assuming
that player can submit only one bid, while in reality multiple bids can be submitted. Results
are several, symmetric equilibrium in the auction with more than two players is the maxmin
equilibrium, while with two players the format is strategically equivalent to the Hawk-Dove
game.
The format usually known as penny auction has been analysed by Hinnosaar (2010) and
Augenblick (2009). In this auction, each bid increases the price of the object, similarly to an
English auction. Bids are costly, and a player wins if she submits a bid and no other bids are
submitted before a certain amount of time. For its characteristics, it is similar to a war of attrition
game (Hinnosaar 2010). In this format, however, players pay a fee only to submit a bid, so they
can choose to remain inactive for a certain period of time.
Both Hinnosaar (2010) and Augenblick (2009) derive the equilibrium of the game and compare
results with empirical observations. Hinnosaar (2010) finds that “in the increasing price auctions,
the upper bound of possible prices is p = [v− c]−1+N and it is reached with positive probability.
This is a very high price where even the winner gets strictly negative payoff”. Augenblick (2009)
analyses the equilibrium hazard rates of penny auction and the mixed–strategy equilibrium. He,
then, compares his results with empirical data, finding that auctioneer’s revenues are usually
higher than the objects’ market value and that the starting hazard rate is similar to predictions,
but it decreases in time. Moreover, He shows that data fits his prediction of sunk cost fallacy,
since players submit several bids. Players’ learning process determines the exit from the game,
although it happens after huge losses.
The last format is price reveal auction, alternatively known as scratch auction. This format
is a descending price auction, where the price is hidden for bidders – who have to pay a fee in
order to observe the price and buy the object – and the price decrease mechanism is endogenous.
Because it is a descending price auction, it is apparently similar to a Dutch auction. However,
in this format, the price is hidden and decreases not because of the time, but because of players’
actions (endogenous price decrease mechanism). The two principal websites which offer this
format are Bidster.com and Dealwonders.com.
To better understand how this auction mechanism works, we can quote the description of the
auction rules of one of the websites which organises this auction format. Bidster.com organises
“scratch auction” since the 29th December 2009 (Gallice 2010), the auction is defined as follow:
“On Bidster’s Scratch Auctions the current price is hidden from the participants until the
participant scratches the auction. Then the participant will see the current price. Every
time someone scratches the auction the price is lowered. So the more people that scratch
the auction the faster the price will drop. [. . . ]
Auction example (Scratch auction): The market price of the product is £ 100. Starting
price for the auction is £ 95 (the start price is hidden for the participants). Every scratch
lowers the price £ 2.5.
When the auction starts Maria scratches the auction and gets the current price of £ 92.50.
She sees the price in 10 seconds, but thinks it is a bit expensive and chooses not to buy
the product for the current price. [. . . ] Maria scratches the auction again and gets the
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current price £ 85.00. She thinks it’s a good price and chooses to purchase the product.
Then the auction ends and Maria is the winner.”2.
To the best of our knowledge, we are aware of only one contribution to the literature with
regard to this format (Gallice 2010). Gallice (2010) develops a model where the price is hidden
in each period. The starting price is set equal to the retail price of the object, and he assumes
that players’ valuation are distributed between zero and the retail price. Players could observe
the price or not. After observing it, they decide to buy the object or not. To observe the price
they should pay a fee c. Every time someone observes the price, it is decreased by a value smaller
than c. The price, in Gallice (2010), decreases only for this reason.
Gallice (2010) derives a very clear prediction for the (unique) perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
According to his model, every player decides not to observe the price and the auctioneer’s revenues
are zero. Since the starting price is known and equal to the maximum valuation and due to the
presence of the cost c, it is not optimal for the player with valuation equal to the retail price to
observe the price. Consequently, the price does not decrease, and players with lower valuations
do not find optimal to participate the auction as well.
The result is that no one observes the price. However, these results – as the same author
observes – are not consistent with empirical data.
As we will sin next sections, due to the hidden price and the bidding fee, the entry of players
is endogenous. Moreover, since the price decreases because of the action of players, the price
decrease mechanism is also endogenous.
The problem of endogenous entry of players in standard auction setting was studied by Levin
and Smith (1994), McAfee and McMillan (1987), Menezes and Monteiro (2000) and Chakraborty
and Kosmopoulou (2001). In particular, Menezes and Monteiro (2000) study the case in which
players known only their valuation and the potential number of participants. They introduce a
threshold strategy according to which only bidders who have a valuation above a certain cut-off
value submit a bid. They, consequently, derive the optimal bidding functions for first price and
second price sealed bid auctions.
3 A model of price reveal auctions
In this section we develop a model for price reveal auctions. The basic mechanism of this auction
format is the following. Players do not know neither the starting price of the object auctioned,
nor the current price at each time. Moreover, they do not know the number of players who have
observed the price previously. A generic player has to pay a fee to observe the price, then he has
to decide to buy the object or not. Price decreases whenever a player observes it.
3.1 The model
The model of price reveal auction consists in a sale of a unique and indivisible object.
There are I = {1, · · · , n} risk neutral bidders. Each player has an i.i.d. private valuation vi,
distributed according to a generic cumulative distribution function (cdf ) F (·) – and probability
density function (pdf ) f (·) – over the support [0, v¯]. The distribution is non decreasing, continuous
and differentiable.
At time t = 0, nature selects players’ valuations. The game starts at t = 1 and it stops at T
or if a player buys the object.
2 Bidster.com (2011), consulted on 28th June 2011
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The price is hidden at each time t. Moreover, the initial price p0 is randomly chosen by nature.
We assume that the auctioneer is always willing to trade.
The starting price is defined as p0 = α, where α is a random variable. It is distributed over
the interval [α, α] according to a cdf G (·) (and a pdf g (·)). The distribution of α and its support,
are known by all players. The starting price could be above the highest valuation v¯, i.e. it could
be the case that α > v¯.
The price of the object decreases, by a positive quantity δ, if only if a player observes it.
Consequently, in each t, the price is pt = p0 − δηt, where ηt ∈ N is the number of times the
price has been observed up to time t. We need to remark that, as in the actual auction format,
the price decreases when a player observes it and, therefore, a generic player i observes the price
already lowered.
Players do not known the price before observing it. Furthermore, they do not know how many
players have observed the price before (i.e. ηt is unknown).
At each time t ≥ 1 – in the same fashion of Gallice (2010) – a generic player i has a set of
strategies Ai,t = {nobs; (obs, b); (obs, nb)}, (∀i ∈ I). Players can decide to observe the price or
not, after having observed it, they choose to buy the object or not. If a player observes the price
and does not buy the object, she will exit the game. To observe the price, bidders pay a fee c > 0
(c > δ) to the auctioneer.
The payoff of a generic player with valuation vi is:
pii =
 vi − pt − c if player i observes and buys the object (at time t)−c if player i observes the price and does not buy the object0 otherwise (3.1)
This setup shares several characteristics with that of Gallice (2010). There are, however, some
different assumptions.
The starting price is a random variable and is hidden to buyers, while in Gallice (2010), the
initial price was known and set equal to the retail price.
The concealment of the starting price reflects the real auction format3. The starting price,
moreover, is random and could be greater than v¯.
A central assumption is that each player can observe the price, and buy the object, only
once. This is indeed a strong assumption, which does not reflect the actual format. However,
it is necessary to derive the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in the game. We will comment this
assumption later, and explain why it is a central assumption and how it can affect theoretical
findings.
3.2 Optimal strategy and second stage decision
Randomness and concealment of the starting price in our auction format, together with the fact
that players are allowed to refuse to buy the object, are critical points of the analysis of the
optimal strategies.
Gallice (2010) introduces a threshold strategy based on the fact that refusing to buy the object
– after the observation of the price – is not optimal in his model. According to his considerations,
the strategy (obs, nb) is dominated and never chosen. Thus, he argues that the equivalence
between first price auction and Dutch auction could be used as platform for building players’
beliefs and strategies.
In our case, since the starting price could be above bidders’ values, we cannot exclude the
strategy (obs, nb). However, we can separate players’ strategies in two stages: in the first one,
3 See, for instance, the description of the game quoted in the first section
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they choose whether observing the price or not, in the second – conditional on observing the
price – they decide to buy or not the object.
The second stage decision trivially depends on the known price. Since players can enter the
auction (observe the price) only once, they will decide to buy the object if the actual price is
below their valuations.
Proposition 1 Conditional on observing the price, player i will buy the object if the price is
below her valuation, i.e. if vi ≥ pt
Proof Conditional on observing the price, player i has already sustained the entry fee c, thus it
is a sunk cost. If she buys the object, she receives a payoff vi − pt.
Since each player can observe the price (and buy the object) only once, the payoff associated
to nb is zero. Therefore, the strategy (obs, b) dominates (obs, nb) if vi − pt ≥ 0. Player i will buy
the object if vi ≥ pt.
3.3 First stage decision
The standard Dutch auction format, in the simplest setting with private valuations, is strategi-
cally equivalent to a first–price sealed bid format. A generic player is willing to stop the auction
whenever the price is equal to (or smaller than) her optimal bid in the equivalent first price
auction; because a generic player maximises her expected payoff, given that no one has stopped
the game before.
In our model, differently from the standard Dutch auction format, players can observe the
price and refuse to buy the object. Therefore, the game can continue also if someone has already
observed the price. This is a central consideration, which should be taken into account when
deriving the optimal strategy.
Proposition 2 Suppose that each player j 6= i follows a strictly decreasing and continuous
strategy t(vj), which maps every valuation with a period t in which is optimal to observe the
price. Suppose also that player i decides to follow a strategy t(x), for an arbitrary value x. Then,
if a player k (k 6= i) observes the price before i and the game continues, we have that the price
(already decreased) is greater than vk > x.
Proof Player k will not buy the object if the price, which she observes, is greater than her
valuation (second stage decision). Moreover, if a player k observes the price before i, it must be
the case that vk > x4. Consequently, we have that the price is higher than vk and x.
If someone has observed the price and refused to buy the object, player i infers that the
price is greater than her private value. Proposition 2 has two main consequences on players’
strategies. On the one hand, beliefs about the current price must be updated taking into account
the possibility that people can observe and refuse to buy the object. On the other hand, player
i bases her maximisation problem on the probability that no one has observed the price before,
otherwise, she expects her surplus to be negative.
Hence, is not optimal to observe the price if someone has observed the price before t(x) (for
x = vi).
A generic player i will maximise the following expected utility:
max {[vi − pt (t (x))] · Pr (t (x) ≤ t (vj) ,∀j 6= i) ; 0} − c (3.2)
4 t(·) is a (strictly) decreasing and continuous function and we have that t(vk) < t(x) ⇐⇒ vk > x.
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max
{
[vi − pt (t(x))] · F (x)n−1 ; 0
}
− c (3.3)
The expected utility is derived as follows. Given that all players j – with j 6= i – follow a
strategy t(vj), and player i has a strategy t(x). If no one has observed the price before – with
probability F (x)n−1 – the expected surplus is positive. On the opposite case, the expected surplus
in negative and i prefers not to buy the object (the the payoff is simply zero). Furthermore, the
fee c must be taken into account.
Note also that, since the price decrease mechanism is endogenous, the price does not decrease
because of the time. And, for this reason, we have that p′t = 0
First order condition for the problem is derived by taking the derivative with respect to x,
and imposing it equal to zero:
max
{
[vi − pt (t(x))] · (n− 1)f(x)F (x)n−2 − p′t (t(x))F (x)n−1 ; 0
}
= 0 (3.4)
it should be optimal for x = vi:
max
{
[vi − pt (t(vi))] · (n− 1)f(vi)F (vi)n−2 − p′t (t(vi))F (vi)n−1 ; 0
}
= 0 (3.5)
We find the usual condition for a Dutch auction, but we should consider also that p′t = 0,
therefore we have that:
max
{
[vi − pt (t(vi))] · (n− 1)f(vi)F (vi)n−2; 0
}
= 0 (3.6)
According to the FOC, players are willing to observe the price as long as they expect it to
be equal to their valuations. Due to price decrease mechanism, players do not find profitable to
wait, because the price is not expected to decrease, and there are only possible losses due to the
fact that someone could observe the price and buy the object.
Note that this is a necessary, but not sufficient condition. In Appendix A we derive the same
result using different arguments.
In the usual Dutch auction format, there is a trade off between the expected marginal gains
of waiting the price to decrease (represented by the lower price in the future) and the marginal
expected losses due to the lower probability of winning the auction. In our model marginal gains
are zero. Since the price decreases if players observe it, either the price is too high or the object
is bought by another player.
In this setting, consequently, players always find optimal to undercut their rivals, as long as
the expected price is smaller than – or equal to – their valuations. Moreover, we should also
consider the fee c.
Remark 1 Given the expected price at time t, the probability of buying the object, which makes
a generic player indifferent between the actions obs and nobs, is:
[vi − pet ]Pr (pt ≤ vi)− c = 0 ⇐⇒ Pr (pt ≤ vi) =
c
vi − pet
(3.7)
In the left hand side, we have the expected utility of the action obs, that is the expected payoff
times the probability of buying the object5 and the participation fee c. While in the right hand
side, zero represents the payoff of the action nobs.
Proposition 3 The optimal (first stage) strategy for a generic player i is to observe the price if
pet ≤ vi − c and if Pr (pt ≤ vi) ≥ cvi−pet
5 That is the probability that the price is below player’s valuation, because of the second stage decision
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Proof Players are willing to undercut their rivals, due to endogenous price decrease mechanism,
and observe the price as soon as the expected price is below or equal to their valuations.
Since a fee c is paid to observe the price, the strategy obs is not optimal when pet = vi. Player
i will observe the price if Pr (pt ≤ vi) ≥ cvi−pet , which corresponds to the case where the expected
utility of obs is greater or equal to that of nobs, given player’s beliefs.
Moreover, since a probability is always included between 0 and 1, we have also that 0 ≤
c
vi−pet ≤ 1. Which means that vi − p
e
t > 0 and vi − pet ≥ c ⇐⇒ pet ≤ vi − c.
3.4 Qualification of Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
Given previous considerations, we can define the PBE of the game.
Proposition 4 A perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game consists in n sequences of actions{
a∗i,t
}T
t=1 (for every i ∈ I) where a∗i,t is player i’s optimal strategy at time t:
a∗i,t =

(obs, b) if µi,t = Pr (pt ≤ vi) ≥ cvi−pet and vi − pt ≥ 0
(obs, nb) if µi,t = Pr (pt ≤ vi) ≥ cvi−pet and vi − pt ≤ 0
(nobs) if µi,t = Pr (pt ≤ vi) < cvi−pet
(3.8)
Where Pr (pt ≤ vi) represents player i’s beliefs about the current price and pet is the expected
price at time t.
Proof The PBE of the game derives from first and second stage decisions. The action nobs
dominates obs if Pr (pt ≤ vi) < cvi−pet , and is dominated otherwise.
Conditional on observing the price, the decision of buying the object depends on vi and pt,
as long as the former is greater than (or equal to) the latter, player i is willing to buy the object,
i.e. (obs, b) strictly (weakly) dominates (obs, nb).
There is not a separating equilibrium of the game. This means that, given expectations about
the price, there will be either no one or a bunch of players who are willing to observe the price.
In particular – when the game starts – if pe1 = E[α] ≥ v¯, no one will enter the auction (since
the expected price is higher or equal to the highest valuation and players should sustain c). The
same happens if E[α] < v¯ and Pr(p1 ≤ v¯) < cv¯−E[α] .
Suppose instead that there is a value v˙ such that 0 < v˙ < v¯ and Pr(p1 ≤ v˙) = cv˙−E[α]M .
Since ∂Pr(p1≤v)∂v ≥ 0, and ∂ cv−E[α]M /∂v < 0, all players with valuations between v˙ and v¯ will be
willing to observe the price.
4 Characterisation of beliefs
There are different considerations to do when analysing players’ beliefs. In period t = 0, players
receive their own signals (their valuations) and have no other information at their disposal.
In period t = 1 the game starts. Therefore, no one has observed the price before – i.e. η1 = 0
– and the expected price at t = 1 is pe1 = E[α]6.
Due to the randomness of the initial price they formulate their beliefs – for the first period –
as follows:
Pr (pt ≤ vi |t = 1) = Pr (α ≤ vi) = G (vi) (4.1)
6 Where E[α] is the expected value of α and is equal to E[α] =
∫ α
α
xg(x)dx (with g(·) pdf of α).
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Where G (·) is the cdf of α. Each player i holds beliefs, at time t = 1, represented by the
probability that α is below vi.
Definition 1 A generic player i with valuation vi holds beliefs at time t = 1 equal to:
µi,1 =
{
G (vi) if α ≤ vi ≤ α
0 otherwise (4.2)
For every t > 1, and until the game is finished, beliefs are updated using new information.
Players consider the information that the game is still continuing as a signal of the current price.
The game continues for two reasons. Either no one has observed the price – and the price is
not expected to decrease – or some players have observed the price but they refused to buy the
object because the price was too high.
This is a central characteristic of the model. Time is a signal about the price. Moreover, it is
a bad signal because the greater is the time elapsed the bigger is the expected price.
To define beliefs for t ≥ 2, we must introduce two definitions. First of all, players do not know
the number of opponents who have observed the price previously. Players, moreover, infer that
only opponents with certain characteristics (i.e with valuations greater than a certain threshold)
have observed the price before.
Definition 2 Define ξt = E (ηt) as the expected number of players who decide to observe the
price up to period t. Note that, since players are rational, ξ1 = η1 = 0.
There is no publicly observable information about the number of players who have already
observed the price. Therefore, a generic player i substitutes the missing information with the
expectation defined above.
Remark 2 In each period t, given beliefs about the price, all players with valuation between v˙t
and v¯ will observe the price, while players with valuation below the former will not. Where v˙t is
defined as follows:
v˙t : Pr (pt ≤ v˙t) = c
v˙t − pet
(4.3)
Beliefs are not decreasing with respect to v, i.e. ∂Pr(pt≤v)∂v ≥ 0, and ∂∂v
(
c
v−pet
)
< 0. Therefore,
there is a value which satisfies the equality which has the following properties: for values below
it, the LHS is smaller than the RHS, and players with those private values are not willing to
observe the price. For values above it, all players will be willing to observe the price; since the
LHS is greater than the RHS.
The above definitions are needed to define the information updating process of players. If
someone is expected to observe the price in the previous period and the game is continuing,
players will update their beliefs thinking that the price is higher than a certain valuation. Given
the absence of information, they compute the expected maximum valuation, defined as follows.
Definition 3 Define the value ve|tmax as the expected maximum valuation conditional on vi ≥ v˙t.
That is the expected value of the highest order statistic, conditional on having values above v˙t.
It is equal to:
ve|tmax =

1
1−F (v˙t)n−1
∫ v¯
v˙t
x · nF (x)n−1 f (x) dx if v˙t < v¯
v¯ otherwise
(4.4)
Where v˙t is defined in expression (4.3).
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If the game continues and players expect that someone has observed the price in the previous
period, they infer that the price is expected to be higher than ve|t−1max . Then we can define beliefs
for t ≥ 2
Definition 4 In a generic period t ≥ 2 beliefs are:
µi,t =

µi,t−1 if ξt = ξt−1
[G(δξt+vi)−G(δξt−1+ve|t−1max )]
1−G
(
δξt−1+ve|t−1max
) if ξt > ξt−1 and this number is positive
0 otherwise
(4.5)
Where ξt is the expected number of times the price was observed up to time t (with ξ1 = 0) and
v
e|t
max is the expected maximum valuation at time t as defined above.
Proof See Appendix B for derivation.
5 Remarks
In our model of price reveal auction, we found that players are willing to undercut their rivals
and observe the price as soon as it is expected to be below or equal to vi−c (and if Pr (pt ≤ vi) ≥
c
vi−pet ).
This behaviour is a consequence of the endogenous price decrease mechanism. Since players
do not expect the price to fall from time to time – because they want to observe the price only
if they expect to buy the object – they do not have any incentive in waiting.
In a standard Dutch auction, this incentive is represented by the price decrease, which creates
a trade–off between lower probability of winning the auction and bigger (positive) difference
between players’ valuation and price. Thus, players can find optimal to observe the price, and
buy the object, if the price is greater than the optimal price in Dutch format (and conditions
underlined above are met).
Moreover, entry in the game is stimulated by the randomness of the starting price, together
with its concealment. Incentives in entering the game, however, decrease with time, because
players update their beliefs and expect the price to be higher if someone has not still bought it.
The fact that the game is still continuing is a bad signal for players. Because it means that
(if initial beliefs are such that someone is expected to observe the price) the price is higher than
the valuation of players who observed it.
Although incentives of observing the price may exist in the initial phases of the game, they
decrease overtime and disappear after a certain period. This is the effect of the beliefs updating
process, which uses time as an information about the concealed price. Similarly to the information
“winning the game” in the winner’s curse in common value auctions, the information “the game
continues” is a bad signal for players, because they are informed about the (high) level of the
price. Consequently, beliefs are updated accordingly.
In Gallice (2010), in equilibrium, players decide not to observe the price in each period. In
our model, however, is theoretically possible to sustain an equilibrium where some players are
willing to observe the price at least in the first place. Our result is coherent with the existence
of the online auction format, since empirically players do participate the auction.
There is not a separating equilibrium. Due to beliefs conformation and the randomness of the
price, there is always either no one or a group of buyers who are willing to observe the price. These
characteristics should be considered carefully, especially when analysing the efficiency properties
of the format.
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The auctioneer finds profitable to increase the number of participants (who observe the price),
rather than selling the object with the highest possible price. This because revenues are raised
through participation fees and the selling price. Moreover, whenever a player observes the price
the auctioneer gains c− δ > 0.
Players can observe the price only once. This is a strong assumption, which does not reflect
the real format. However, it is necessary to derive the PBE. By removing this assumption, second
stage decision (buy or not buy the object) depends on expectation of future prices, which is an
endogenous variable (because it depends on players’ optimal strategies); so it is necessary, due to
complexity of strategic space, although it affects the power of our model of explaining empirical
observations.
6 Numerical examples and empirical observations
In this section we will show a simple example of the game. Suppose that there are n = 4 players,
with i.i.d. uniformly valuations distributed over the interval [0, 1]. Furthermore, assume α to be
distributed uniformly between [0.1, 1.1]. Therefore, its expectation is E[α] = 0.6 and pe0 = 0.6.
To simplify our analysis, assume that players have the following valuations7: v1 = 0.8, v2 =
0.6, v3 = 0.5 and v4 = 0.1. We will observe three cases.
First case
Suppose that the realization of α is 0.9, so the (concealed) starting price is equal to this value.
Assume the value of δ to be 0.05, while the participation fee is equal to c = 0.12. In this case,
participation fees are relatively big (about 10% of the upper–bound in the valuations support).
Remark 3 At time 1, all players with valuation over v˙1 = 0.82 will observe the price. Where this
value is derived as follows (using expression 4.3):
v˙t : Pr (0.6− 0.05 ≤ v˙t) = 0.12v˙t−(0.6−0.05)
v˙t : 1− 0.55 = 0.12v˙t−0.55
v˙t = 0.82
(6.1)
No one, therefore, will observe the price. However, beliefs are updated taking into account that
the number of observed is not a public observable information. At time 1, no one is expected to
observe the price (ξ1 ≈ 0)8. So beliefs do not change and no one will observe the price.
High participation fees, and the particular realisation of valuations – i.e. no one has a private
value higher than 0.82 – leads to non participation.
Second case
Assume now that c = 0.01 and δ = 0.005. Now fees represents 1% of the higest valuation. The
realisation of α is, again, 0.9.
7 Which is a private information
8 Note that ξ1 is the expectation of η1 and is derived as the expected number of players with valuations between
0.85 and 1. Since valuations are uniformly distributed, we have that ξ1 = 4 · (1− 0.82)4 ≈ 0.004.
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Remark 4 At time 1, all players with valuation over v˙1 = 0.625 will observe the price. Where
this value is derived as follows (using expression 4.3):
v˙t : Pr (0.6− 0.005 ≤ v˙t) = 0.01v˙t−(0.6−0.005)
v˙t : 1− 0.595 = 0.01v˙t−0.595
v˙t = 0.62
(6.2)
In this case, player one will observe the price, since it has a valuation above 0.62. However, he
will not buy the object because his surplus is smaller than zero. This because, the starting price is
p0 = α = 0.9, when player 1 observes the price he will see the price p = 0.9−0.005 = 0.895 > 0.8.
Moreover, as before, no one is expected to observe the price, i.e. ξ1 ≈ 0.
Lower fees stimulate entry. The concealed starting price, however, is too high and no one will
buy the object. Players update their beliefs and expect the price not to change significantly, so
they do not observe the price.
Third case
Assume c = 0.01, δ = 0.005, and α = 0.7. The value v˙1 = 0.62 does not change. Player 1 will
observe the price also in this case. Moreover, he will buy the object, since its surplus is positive
(p = 0.7− 0.005 = 0.695 < 0.8). The auction will end in first period.
These three examples are useful to explain the characteristics of the model. Randomness of
initial price stimulates entry of players, who observe the price also if the unknown realisation is
too high. Therefore, the distribution can avoid entry of players regardless to the actual realisation
(as, for instance, in the first case if we suppose α = 0.2).
Participation fees have an important role in entry of players. Finally, beliefs are updated, and
time is considered a bad signal in our model. Players learn not to observe the price because they
expect an high price.
6.1 Empirical observations
Finally, we must consider empirical results from the online auctions. Table n. 1 shows some
summary statistics about all price reveal auctions held in Bidster.com between the 4th January
2010 and the 26th April 2011.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
marketp Market price 135 441.3407 373.2719 25 1700
disc Discount 135 .3495556 .1776331 .05 .999
c Participation fee 135 1.062963 1.07278 .5 10
parti N. of participants 13 140 86.93197 7 325
totdur_d Tot. length (days) 135 50.24215 46.48102 .17 307.83
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of all paying price reveal auctions ran in Bidster.com and ended between the 4th
January 2010 and the 26th April 2011
According to these data, the average discount is 34.95%, and auctions last, in average, ap-
proximatively 50 days (with a maximum value of about 307 days). These values are relatively
high, especially considering theoretical results.
A model of descending auction with hidden starting price and endogenous price decrease 13
marketp disc c parti totdur_d
marketp 1.00 (135)
disc -0.28 (135) 1.00 (135)
c 0.11 (135) 0.07 (135) 1.00 (135)
parti 0.51 (13) -0.22 (13) -0.03 (13) 1.00 (13)
totdur_d 0.28 (135) 0.07 (135) 0.07 (135) 0.47 (135) 1.00 (135)
Table 2 Pairwise correlation matrix for all paying price reveal auctions ran in Bidster.com and ended between
the 4th January 2010 and the 26th April 2011 (N. of observations in brackets)
Our prediction is that players can observe the price, but the longer is the time elapsed the
lower are players’ incentives of observing the price. Thus our model does not properly explain
the average duration of the game.
Furthermore, it is interesting to look at the pairwise correlation matrix (Table n. 2). The
market value of objects is positively correlated with the number of participants and, consequently,
negatively related with the discount.
Participation fees have a negative correlation with the number of entries in the auction. This
is consistent with the threshold rule derived in our model (expression 4.3) and with our numerical
examples.
Our theoretical results, however, does not perfectly match with empirical observations. This
is principally due to different assumptions of our model. As said in the first pages of this paper,
the difference between empirical observations and theoretical predictions is a problem which is
present in other studies about all new formats of auctions9.
Moreover, Gallice (2010) has explained differences between predictions and actual data by
arguing that the main cause is bounded rationality. Although, it could be reasonable to allow for
bounded rationality, these differences are also due to our assumptions. Removing them, however,
leads to the absence of an equilibrium.
7 Conclusions
We develop a model of descending auction with hidden price and endogenous price decrease.
In this auction format, known as price reveal auction, the price is hidden in each period and
decreases if only if players observe the price. Our model is theoretically based on the model of
Gallice (2010). He assumes the starting price to be known by all bidders and equal to the market
value of the object (which is also equal to the highest value of players’ valuations’ distribution
v¯).
We introduce, instead, a hidden starting price, to fit better the format which is run on the
Internet. We define the starting price as a random variable, which can assume values also above
the highest players’ valuation (v¯).
Players’ strategies are divided in two stages: decision of observing the price or not, and –
conditional on observing the price – decision to buy or to exit the game. However, we assume
that players could not observe the price – and buy the object – more than once.
Our results have some interesting characteristics. First of all, we find that, due to the endoge-
nous price decrease mechanism, players do not have any incentive in waiting. They, therefore,
are willing to observe the price as long as it is expected to be below their valuations. This result
differs with respect to a standard Dutch auction, where players wait until the price reaches the
optimal bid of an equivalent first-price sealed bid auction.
9 See Gallice (2010); Houba et al. (2011); Östling et al. (2007); Eichberger and Vinogradov (2008); Rapoport
et al. (2007); Hinnosaar (2010); Augenblick (2009)
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Moreover, we find that it is possible to have an equilibrium with some players who observe
the price, at least in the first period. This result is different from Gallice (2010), who finds that
players do not observe the price because of their beliefs. Our findings could explain partially the
empirical observations, because entry is theoretically possible.
In our model there is not a separating equilibrium. Given beliefs and players’ characteristics,
in each period there will be either no one or a group of players who are willing to observe the
price.
Future developments are represented by the possibility of allowing boundedly rational players,
and of analysing efficiency properties of the format.
Appendix
A First stage decision
We can derive the same result in expression (3.6) using different arguments. The strategy t(vi) is optimal for
player i as long as she finds profitable to observe the price in t(vi) instead of t(vi) + dt.
At t(vi), player i has an expected payoff of max [vi − pt; 0].
At t(vi) + dt, two possible cases should be considered. If no one has observed the price, the price does not
change. The probability of this case is 1 − (n − 1)f(vi)F (vi)n−2 dtt′(vi)
10. So with this probability the price does
not change.
If another player, instead, observes the price, there are two possibilities. If she buys the item, then player i
payoff would be zero. If she does not buy the item, for Proposition 2, player i infers that pt(vi)+dt is greater than
her valuation and, consequently, pt(vi)+dt > vi. Therefore the surplus is negative.
So the optimal condition is:
– When the price is greater than vi, the optimal first order condition is 0 = 0 (always satisfied).
– When the price is smaller than (or equal to) vi, between t(vi) and t(vi) + dt, with probability[
1− (n− 1)f(vi)F (vi)n−2 dtt′(vi)
]
no one observes the price and it does not change. With the complementary
probability someone (with valuation equal to vi) observes the price and buys the object. And the optimal
condition is:
max {vi − pt; 0} = max
{
[vi − pt]
[
1− (n− 1)f(vi)F (vi)n−2 dt
t′(vi)
]
; 0
}
(A.1)
which becomes (we can remove the max operator because we supposed that pt ≤ vi):
[vi − pt]
[
(n− 1)f(vi)F (vi)n−2 dt
t′(vi)
]
= 0 (A.2)
The left hand side represents the marginal cost of waiting until t(vi) + dt, while 0 represents the marginal
gain from waiting. It is optimal to stop at t(vi) if the marginal cost of waiting (not observing the price) is
greater or equal to the marginal gain of not stopping (the LHS is greater or equal to 0).
Players are willing to observe the price as soon as pt ≤ vi11, because they do not expect the price to decrease
exogenously. Note that this is only a necessary condition, which does not take into account the fee c.
B Definition of beliefs
When no one is expected to observe the price in previous period, i.e. ξt = ξt−1, price does not change, and beliefs
remain stable overtime.
If ξt > ξt−1 beliefs are updated as follows12:
10 That is the complementary probability of the event in which a player with a valuation vi observes the price
between t(vi) and t(vi) + dt.
11 Since the price is hidden, players will use the expected price at time t denoted as pet
12 Note that we are applying Bayes rule: P (A |B ) = P (A∩B)
P (B)
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Pr
(
pt ≤ vi
∣∣∣t, vi, pt−1 ≥ ve|t−1max ) = Pr(α− δξt ≤ vi ∣∣∣t, α− δξt−1 ≥ ve|t−1max )
=
[
G (δξt + vi)−G
(
δξt−1 + ve|t−1max
)]
/
[
1−G
(
δξt−1 + ve|t−1max
)] (B.1)
Bidders use the information “no one has bought the object” as a signal of the possible value of the price. This
formula is negative when δξt + vi < δξt−1 + ve|t−1max , then µi,t = 0.
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